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The Internet of Things (IoT), as a cutting-edge integrated cross-technology, promises to infor-
mationize people’s daily lives, while being threatened by continuous challenges of eavesdropping
and tampering. The emerging quantum cryptography, harnessing the random nature of quantum
mechanics, may also enable unconditionally secure control network, beyond the applications in se-
cure communications. Here, we present a quantum-enhanced cryptographic remote control scheme
that combines quantum randomness and one-time pad algorithm for delivering commands remotely.
We experimentally demonstrate this on an unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) control system. We
precharge quantum random number (QRN) into controller and controlee before launching UAV,
instead of distributing QRN like standard quantum communication during flight. We statistically
verify the randomness of both quantum keys and the converted ciphertexts to check the security
capability. All commands in the air are found to be completely chaotic after encryption, and only
matched keys on UAV can decipher those commands precisely. In addition, the controlee does not
response to the commands that are not or incorrectly encrypted, showing the immunity against
interference and decoy. Our work adds true randomness and quantum enhancement into the realm
of secure control algorithm in a straightforward and practical fashion, providing a promoted solution
for the security of artificial intelligence and IoT.
With the rapid development of artificial intelligence and
IoT, greater demands are being placed on the security
by growing hacking incidents. To implement crypto-
graphic remote control, two general types of key-based al-
gorithms, public-key and symmetric, are being widely in-
vestigated. Public-key algorithms use two different keys
for encryption and decryption, and are often based on
computational complexity; while they are imperfect in
the real world for being slow, and vulnerable to chosen-
plaintext attacks [1]. Conventional symmetric algorithms
require that communication parties share matched and
secret keys in advance; while the security of such al-
gorithms rely on the shared keys. One-time pad [2],
as a powerful symmetric algorithm, has been proved by
Claude Shannon to be impossible to crack [3], as long as
crucial problems of generating and sharing real random
sequences are settled.
Randomness is a fundamental resource with significant
applications in cryptography and numerical simulation.
Real random sequences, however, are hard to generate
mathematically [4], but have to rely on unpredictable
physical processes [5–9]. Although different mechanics,
such as chaotic effects [10, 11], thermal noise [12], bio-
metric parameters [13] and free-running oscillators [14]
are employed in the generation of physical random num-
ber, they are faced with some problems like hard to de-
tect failure [15]. The inherent uncertainty of quantum
mechanics makes quantum systems an excellent stochas-
tic source, with the fact that a single photon incident on
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a 50:50 beam splitter be transmitted or reflected is in-
trinsically random. More importantly, the randomness is
precisely balanced and immune to environmental pertur-
bations.
Sharing randomness is another crucial problem to be
settled for realizing symmetric algorithms. One best-
known scheme is quantum key distribution (QKD), which
is quite mature so far for applications, with enormous
progresses [16–19] and is even ready for constructing se-
cure networks [20–24]. Nevertheless, many situations of
IoT control are not compatible with QKD schemes. For
example, sensor networks require low cost, low power and
miniature devices, which is hard to be met by QKD sys-
tems [25], especially for large-scale and distributed sensor
networks.
Interestingly, in many situations, real-time sharing of
randomness is not really necessary in practice. For in-
stance, UAVs or satellites are essentially well identified
before being launched, and are well isolated with other
parties during their missions. For all these situations,
we could precharge quantum keys into controllers and
controlees, and implement cryptographic remote control
with quantum enhancement in a straightforward and
practical way. In this work, we present this quantum-
enhanced cryptographic remote control scheme that com-
bines quantum randomness and one-time pad algorithm
for delivering commands remotely, and experimentally
demonstrate this on a UAV control system.
The cryptographic system is composed of three sub-
systems: key management unit, controller unit and con-
trolee unit, as is shown in Figure 1(a). The randomness
derived from quantum nature of single photons is charged
into IoT devices through secure key storage (SKS) chips
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2FIG. 1: Quantum-enhanced cryptographic remote control. (a) A schematic diagram of quantum-enhanced crypto-
graphic remote control system and the potential applications. The quantum random number generator utilized here is the
“Quantis USB” of ID Quantique company. Scenarios applicable to our direct-charging scheme: remote control of UAV, high-
speed rail scheduling, vessel movement, airport dispatch and smart grid control. (b) A specific example that combines QRN
keys and one-time pad algorithm for delivering commands remotely
to perform one-time pad encryption and decryption. The
connection of flexible small-scale SKS chips to QRN gen-
erator is realized by a home-built key management unit.
SKS chips are planted into controllers and controlees be-
fore they are detached. Commands are encrypted by one-
time pad algorithm with a certain section of keys, which
can only be decrypted correctly by the controlee with cor-
responding keys. On the controller side, with QRN keys,
a bitwise exclusive OR is performed on commands before
sent; and conversely, with identical keys, commands can
be deciphered and executed on the controlee side, as is
shown in Figure 1(b).
The data transmission diagram of our UAV control
system is illustrated in Figure 2(a). Encryption keys are
generated by Quantis, which is a reliable QRN generator,
employing a quantum process as the source of random-
ness, and producing random sequences at a bit rate of
4 Mb/s. To be specific, a photon incident on a semi-
transparent mirror will be reflected with half the prob-
ability, leading to a “0”; or transmitted with half the
probability, leading to an “1”. A microcontroller is ded-
icated for charging or updating quantum keys into SKS
chips.
The successful execution of one-time pad algorithm de-
pends on the synchronization of keys. Unfortunately, it
happens that commands get lost or error, leading to key
mismatch between controllers and controlees. Any mi-
nor key mismatch may cause control system failure. To
solve this problem, we assign unique address information
to each command, so that each command with quan-
tum keys is independent and well labeled. Once error
happens, the corresponding command will be discarded
directly together with its encryption and decryption keys
to maintain the synchronization. Such address informa-
tion doesn’t have to be encrypted, because they include
TABLE I: Balance and runs properties. P -values for
uniformity check, and proportions for examination of the se-
quences that pass a certain statistical test (Success Rate). 20
pieces of commands are tested.
Test Index P -value Proportion Result
Frequency 0.4861 1 SUCCESS
Runs 0.4719 1 SUCCESS
3FIG. 2: Signal flow diagram and NIST tests of quantum randomness. (a) Signal flow diagram of the quantum-enhanced
cryptographic control system. (b) NIST statistical randomness tests performance of quantum keys. The experimental results
are obtained from 1,638,400 bits samples with a significance level of α = 0.01. In the histogram, the value of each test that
exceed the red dashed line turns out a successful pass.
FIG. 3: The auto-correlation function measured among long commands ciphertexts. The auto-correlation function
of ideal random sequence is close to delta function. The sharp auto-correlation peak in the center indicates that the encrypted
binary sequence has excellent independence on each part. The insets show auto-correlation details in the near- and far-field
regime.
no information about commands.
The randomness of quantum keys is a crucial param-
eter that determines system security. Quantum random
number based on the uncertainty principle of quantum
mechanics provides the honest-to-goodness randomness
in the world, with the properties of unpredictable and
unreproducible [1]. We use NIST suites to perform sta-
tistical tests [26], and the final results are shown in Figure
2(b). The results are P -valuess of all 15 tests: indicat-
ing how a sequence is identical to purely random number,
ideally P -values equals to one. The results of NIST tests
prove an excellent statistical randomness of our quantum
keys.
Furthermore, according to one-time pad algorithm,
4FIG. 4: Experimental results of intercepted commands (a) Intercepted five pieces of typical commands with (blue
lines) and without (red lines) one-time pad encryption for comparison. (b) Details of each functional command. The last four
bytes of ciphertexts represent the assigned address information of quantum keys. One command is combined with 32 bytes, and
each byte represents for an integer whose values range from 0 to 255, stored with eight binaries. See Supplementary Materials
for details.
where ciphertexts are the XOR values of quantum keys
and plaintexts, the randomness of quantum keys deter-
mines that of ciphertexts. We intercept a section of com-
mands in the air sent by the controller, and test them
with three characteristics of random binary sequences
proposed by Gobomb: balance property, runs property
and auto-correlation property [27]. The good proper-
ties of balance, runs (see Table I), and auto-correlation
(see Figure3) indicate that our ciphertexts are statisti-
cally random. Meanwhile, since the quantum keys are
unpredictable and unrepeatable, the ciphertexts inter-
cepted here are expected and experimentally observed
to be truly random, which is impossible to be deciphered
without matched quantum keys.
Experimental commands between the remote control
and the aircraft are shown in Figure 4. We intercept five
pieces of different functional commands, with and with-
out one-time pad encryption for comparison. For plain-
texts, we can see that five repeating commands share
exactly identical values; while for ciphertexts, five re-
peating commands are bought into chaos, and there is
no correlation between any two commands or even any
two bytes, which guarantees the security as have been
proved statistically in Table I and Figure 3, according to
three postulates proposed by Golomb [27].
Since the security of the commands depends on the
one-time pad, the communication capacity in this cryp-
tographic control scheme is mainly limited by the num-
ber of pre-charged QRNs. To extend the key updating
period, on one hand, the capacity of secure key storage
device should be large enough, while it might take more
bytes in the commands for storing keys’ address infor-
mation. On the other hand, the encryption commands
can be optimized according to different structures, and
some trivial information in a certain command could be
ignored to save keys, as well as to increase decryption
speed.
In summary, we have proposed and experimentally
demonstrated a quantum-enhanced cryptographic re-
mote control scheme that combines quantum randomness
and one-time pad algorithm for delivering commands re-
motely. The quantum-enhanced cryptographic scheme
are expected to be generalized to bidirectional systems:
controlees can be securely controlled and also be able to
send encrypted recorded flight data back to controllers,
such as position, direction and speed. Besides, the point-
to-point solution can be extended to point-to-multipoint
or distributed networks. More importantly, such scheme
can be combined with fixed QKD channels [23, 28–30] for
long-distance quantum keys charging, providing a flexi-
ble solution for control security of artificial intelligence
and IoT in large scale.
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6Supplemental Information: Experimental Quantum-enhanced Cryptographic Remote
Control
Supplementary Note 1: Commands reliability testing
To test the reliability of cryptographic remote control scheme, commands emitted by the UAV controller are
intercepted and processed by another microcontroller (STM32). As for general cases, without encryption, the five-
time repeated commands intercepted are demonstrated in FIG. S1(a). Inserted is the command structure which
consists of 32 bytes, and each byte consists of eight “0” or “1” bits. Thus the value of a byte ranges from 0 to 255.
The key address information added in the command is not encrypted, which contains no information without local
quantum key storage devices.
As for situations with quantum-enhanced encryption, commands sent by the UAV controller are encrypted by one-
time pad algorithm. The ciphertexts intercepted are shown in FIG. S1(b). We can see that the five-time repeated
commands has been brought into chaos, except for the bytes which carry key address information (marked in shadows).
According to the key address information, the controllee can read out quantum keys and perform one-time pad
decryption process. The randomness of ciphertexts has been tested and presented in Figure 3 and Table I in the main
text.
Supplementary Figure 1: Intercepted commands before and after encryption. (a) The plaintexts of five-time repeated
commands. The inserted represents the structure of a command. (b) The ciphertexts of five-time repeated commands. Shadows
mark the key information in each commands.
A brief structure of a command is shown in the insert of FIG. S1. Even different functional commands share parts
of the same bytes to maintain stable communication process. Therefore, it is not necessary to encrypt all 32 bytes
in a command, and we can just perform one-time pad encryption on the bytes that carry fatal information, to save
quantum keys. Values of plaintexts of five commands (blue lines) presented in Figure 4 in the main text are shown in
Table I. According to the command structure, they are similar but not the same.
7Supplementary Table 1: Intercepted values of plaintexts sent by the UAV controller. Red values show the
difference.
Connection
36 77 60 16 105 221 5 221 5 219 5 220 5 220 5 220
5 221 5 0 0 166 0 0 0 0 0 0 221 255 223 255
Backward
36 77 60 16 105 221 5 221 5 219 5 232 3 221 5 220
5 221 5 0 0 149 0 0 0 0 0 0 221 191 215 255
Turn Left
36 77 60 16 105 221 5 220 5 234 3 219 5 220 5 220
5 221 5 0 0 168 0 0 0 0 0 0 221 255 215 255
Turn Right
36 77 60 16 105 221 5 221 5 208 7 219 5 220 5 221
5 220 5 0 0 168 0 0 0 0 0 0 221 255 215 255
Forward
36 77 60 16 105 220 5 220 5 220 5 208 7 220 5 219
5 221 5 0 0 168 0 0 0 0 0 0 221 255 215 255
